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Abstract
The Republic of Turkey has initiated an ambitious reform program in the most 
important segments of her energy market; which requires privatization, 
liberalization as well as a radical restructuring of these industries. However, 
there is no consensus that the measures introduced are optimal. The present 
article attempts, first, to evaluate the regulatory framework created by the 
laws of 2001 in terms of economic efficiency considerations; and second, to 
determine what still needs to be done to improve the current situation. The 
paper not only provides an analysis of these reforms but also lists some 
policy suggestions. The study concludes that despite relatively good 
legislative framework, in practice, the reforms in Turkey are far from ideal as 
they are mainly in the form of “textbook reforms”; and therefore a significant 
amount of work still lies ahead of Turkey to set up a fully-fledged energy 
market.
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21. Introduction
The Republic of Turkey (hereafter Turkey) has initiated a major reform 
program of the regulatory framework surrounding the most important 
segments of her energy market; namely, electricity, natural gas, petroleum 
and liquefied petroleum gas industries. The reform program entails 
privatization, liberalization as well as a radical restructuring of the whole 
energy industry. Also, an autonomous regulatory body, Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority (EMRA), was created to set up and maintain a 
financially strong, stable, transparent and competitive energy market.
Although there exists a huge literature on market regulation; to the best of my 
knowledge, so far, no scholar has studied and analyzed the regulatory 
framework created by the laws of 2001 in terms of economic efficiency 
considerations or tried to answer the question what still needs to be done to 
improve the current situation. The present article aims at filling this gap in the 
literature. Since it is obvious that the reforms will have important implications 
for the future of the country, the present article constitutes an important 
contribution not only to the existing literature but also to the energy policy 
formulation process in Turkey. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the historical 
background of Turkish energy markets starting from the early 1900s up to the 
present time. Section 3 provides an overview of recent market reforms. 
                                                                                                                                         
institution he is affiliated with.
3Section 4 critically analyzes the compatibility of regulatory practice in Turkey 
with the theory of regulation. To improve current regulatory framework, next 
section lists some policy suggestions with crucial importance. The final 
section concludes.
2. Historical Background1
Hepbasli (2005) reports that in Turkey “the first electric generator was a 2 kW 
dynamo connected to the water mill installed in Tarsus” in 1902; and, he 
continues, “[t]he first bigger power plant was installed in Silahtaraga, Istanbul, 
in 1913”. The following evolution of Turkish energy market may be 
summarized as follows.
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, and until the 1930s the 
electricity industry2 was heavily dependent on foreign investment as the 
country was trying a liberal economy. In the 1930s, there was a widespread 
belief all over the world in the benefits of public ownership of the electricity 
industry. Following this trend, nationalization of Turkish electricity industry 
started in 1938 and, by 1944, almost all electricity industry had been placed 
within the public domain.
In the 1960s, the government started the “development plans era”. The 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) was established in 1963, 
                                                
1 An in-dept analysis of the history of Turkish energy markets is outside the scope of this 
article. For a more detailed study of this subject, please see IEA (2005), OECD (2002), 
World Bank (2004), EMRA (2003), Hepbasli (2005), Ozkivrak (2005), Krishnaswamy and 
Stuggins (2003); and Atiyas and Dutz (2003).
2 As the reform process has concentrated around electricity industry, the main focus of the 
article is placed on that segment of Turkish energy market.
4and was responsible for Turkey’s energy policy. This was followed in 1970 by 
the creation of Turkish Electricity Administration (TEK), which would have a 
monopoly in the Turkish electricity sector at almost all stages apart from 
distribution, which were left to the local administrations3.
In the early 1980s, as was the case in many European countries, the Turkish 
electricity industry was dominated by a state-owned vertically integrated 
company, TEK. Starting from the 1980s, the government sought to attract 
private participation into the industry in order to ease the investment burden 
on the general budget. In 1982, the monopoly of public sector on generation 
was abolished and the private sector was allowed to build power plants and 
sell their electricity to TEK. In 1984, TEK was restructured and gained the 
status of state-owned enterprise. 
Various private sector participation models short of privatization were put into 
practice. The first law setting up a framework for private participation in 
electricity industry was enacted in 1984 (Law No. 3096). This Law forms the 
legal basis for private participation through Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) 
contracts for new generation facilities, Transfer of Operating Rights (TOOR) 
contracts for existing generation and distribution assets, and the 
autoproducer system for companies to produce their own electricity. Under a 
BOT concession, a private company would build and operate a plant for up to 
99 years (subsequently reduced to 49 years) and then transfer it to the state 
at no cost. Under a TOOR, the private enterprise would operate (and 
                                                
3 In 1982, however, distribution was also transferred to TEK, thus making TEK a national 
vertically integrated monopoly fully owned by the state.
5rehabilitate where necessary) an existing government-owned facility through 
a lease-type arrangement (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003).
In 1993, TEK was incorporated into privatization plan and split into two 
separate state-owned enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity Generation 
Transmission Co. (TEAS) and Turkish Electricity Distribution Co. (TEDAS). 
However, the constitutional court of Turkey issued a series of rulings in 1994 
and 1995 making the privatization almost impossible to implement in 
electricity industry. To overcome the deadlock; in August 1999, the 
parliament passed a constitutional amendment permitting the privatization of 
public utility services and allowing international arbitration for resolving 
disputes. However, during this interval, Turkey not only lost five invaluable 
years in terms of reform process that could never get back but also, and 
more importantly, tried to enhance the attractiveness of BOT projects by 
providing “take or pay” guarantees by the Undersecretariat of Treasury for 
adding new generation capacity to meet anticipated demand. An additional 
law, namely the Build Operate and Own4 (BOO) Law (No. 4283), for private 
sector participation in the construction and operation of new power plants 
was also enacted in 1997 again with guarantees provided by the Treasury5. 
Current structure of the contracts concluded based on these laws acts as a 
major barrier to the development of competition in the electricity sector.
                                                
4 Under the BOO model, investors retain ownership of the facility at the end of the contract 
period. That is, it is a kind of licensing system rather than a concession award.
5 A typical BOT, BOO or TOOR generation contract, signed between the private party and 
TEAS or TEDAS, includes exclusive “take or pay” obligations with fixed quantities (in 
general, 85% of the plant output) and prices (or price formulas) over 15-30 years. That is, 
under these models, the government retains most commercial risks while providing the 
private sector with substantial rewards. Also the situation was worse in Turkey as, in Turkish 
case; there was no requirement for prequalification or even for a competitive open tender to 
63. Recent Market Reforms
3.1. The Definition of Reform
In Oxford English Dictionary (2002), the term “reform” is defined as “[t]he 
amendment, or altering for the better, of some faulty state of things”. In line 
with this definition; in this paper, the term “reform” refers to measures 
introduced so as to both amend the previous faulty state of things in energy 
industry that resulted in the problems listed in the following section and alter 
for the better situation in which these problems may be solved. Those actions 
taken to postpone the problems are not regarded as reform in this paper. To 
put it shortly, this article only refers to the period following the enactment of 
2001 laws as “reform period”. All other measures aiming at delaying the 
approaching energy crisis (such as BOT, BOO, TOOR schemes) do not 
constitute a part of “reform period” in this context. 
3.2. Reasons
The reasons or problems that triggered the reform process in Turkey may be 
listed as follows in order of importance: 
1. The rapid growth in electricity demand combined with the inability of the 
government to meet that demand through previous structure based on 
public or Treasury-guaranteed private investments
                                                                                                                                         
conclude these contracts (Atiyas and Dutz, 2003), which resulted in onerous terms and high 
electricity prices.
7In Turkey, however, there exists no consensus over the actual size of the 
problem of "rapid electricity demand growth". Even some argue that, the 
official electricity projections have overestimated electricity demand to 
justify the construction of new power plants to use excess amount of 
natural gas (Ozturk et al., 2005).
2. Foreign influence
The need for an energy market reform has regularly been underlined by 
various international institutions (especially IMF, World Bank and OECD) 
that have supported Turkey during her frequent economic crises. The 
reform is also a precondition for Turkey’s longer term objective of EU 
membership6, which requires progressive liberalization of energy markets. 
Although this foreign influence factor resulted in considerable skepticism 
in Turkey about the real aims of the reforms7; effective implementation of 
recent reforms constitutes the only reasonable way to meet growing 
energy demand in Turkey. If the reforms are not implemented properly, 
the result may turn out to be an energy crisis with a potential to hinder the 
economic development of the whole economy.
                                                
6 In October 2005, accession negotiations are opened with Turkey, who has been an 
associate member of the EU since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999. For a more 
detailed discussion of EU-Turkey relations, see Erdogdu (2002).
7 Even still some regard whole reform process as a Western plot designed to control Turkish 
energy market through multinational corporations.
83. Fiscal problems
A third rationale in reform process has been budget deficit problems. The 
government simply recognized that it cannot finance the capacity 
expansions necessary to meet future energy demand.
4. Planning and operational inefficiencies in public sector
Like any other developing country, state monopolies in Turkey have been 
inefficient and politicians have been ready to tolerate this inefficiency. 
5. Possibility of monopoly abuse
Although the objective of preventing monopoly abuse is regarded as the 
primary reason for any market regulation in the literature; in Turkey, its 
influence has been extremely limited as the primary aim in Turkish case is 
to get rid of inefficient state monopolies, not to prevent monopoly abuse.
By the end of the 1990s, it became clear that quasi-privatization with 
Treasury guarantees was not going to be feasible given the rapidly 
deteriorating fiscal situation. Therefore, Turkey turned to a radically different 
framework for the design of her energy market.
On 3 March 2001, Electricity Market Law (EML, No. 4628) came into force 
and aimed at establishing a financially strong, stable, transparent and 
competitive electricity market. In line with new law, TEAS was restructured to 
9form three new state-owned public enterprises, namely Turkish Electricity 
Transmission Co. (TEIAS), Electricity Generation Co. (EUAS) and Turkish 
Electricity Trading and Contracting Co. (TETAS). The new law also created 
an autonomous regulatory body, namely Electricity Market Regulatory 
Authority. 
Along the lines of developments in electricity sector, some other reforms 
were also introduced in other segments of the energy industry. On 2 May 
2001, Natural Gas Market Law (NGML, No. 4646) also came into force and 
aimed at achieving similar objectives in natural gas market. It also renamed 
the regulatory body as Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA). As a 
final step, Petroleum Market Law (PML, No. 5015) and Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas Market Law (LPGML, No.5307) came into force on 20 December 2003 
and 13 March 2005 respectively and EMRA was granted the responsibility to 
regulate these markets as well. 
3.3. Market Reforms
3.3.1. Reforms in Turkish Electricity Market
Electricity Market Law8 (EML) made former laws on private investment in the 
electricity sector obsolete. The main issues and building blocks of the new 
system are given below.
                                                
8 EML is, for the most part, compatible with the EU Electricity Directive of 2003 with the main 
exception that it does not allow state-owned generation companies to sell electricity directly 
to the eligible consumers but only to the wholesale company.
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3.3.1.1. Market Opening and Market Design
Currently, on the demand side, consumers that consume more than 7.8 GWh 
per annum are designated as “eligible consumers” that are free to choose 
their suppliers9. The ultimate aim is stated as 100% market opening. On the 
supply side, the authorization-type licensing framework was established in 
the new regime, which provides entry opportunities into generation, 
wholesale supply, distribution, retail supply, import and export of electricity. 
Transmission remains as a state monopoly.
At the heart of the new regime is a bilateral contracts market where 
generation companies contract with wholesale trade companies (TETAS and 
any eventual new entrants), distribution companies, any new independent 
retail supply companies, and eligible consumers. As for end-users, eligible 
consumers may not only buy electricity from their regional distribution/retail 
supply company, but also may buy directly from a wholesale company, a new 
independent retail supply company or an independent generator. Captive (or 
non-eligible) consumers, on the other hand, must buy their electricity from the 
distribution/retail supply company in their region, but they also have the right 
to buy from any retail supply company operating in the region.
The EML requires the regulated third party access (rTPA) regime for access 
to the transmission and distribution system. The regulatory body (EMRA) will 
carry out the function of dispute settlement between parties.
                                                
9 As of October 2004, about 270 eligible consumers signed a bilateral contract with a new 
supplier (IEA, 2005, p 147).
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As for public service obligations, the EML only allows for an explicit cash 
subsidy in the form of direct cash refunds to consumers without affecting the 
price structure in cases where some consumers need to be supported based 
on non-economic objectives.
The current market design does not envisage a centralized pool or power 
exchange. The actual real-time equality of demand and supply, given the 
bilateral contracts, will be carried out by the system operator (that is, TEIAS) 
through purchases and sales in a balancing market. For this purpose, a 
“System Balancing and Settlement Center” is to be established within TEIAS. 
In short, it is expected that the market would be mostly by bilateral contracts 
and pool would be limited to balancing transactions only.
3.3.1.2. Restructuring
As discussed above, TEAS has been further unbundled into EUAS 
(generation), TETAS (wholesale trading and contracting) and TEIAS 
(transmission), each organized as a separate legal entity.
Under the new structure, EUAS will take over existing public power plants 
that are not transferred to the private sector. TETAS is created to carry out 
wholesale operations and it seems that it will dominate wholesale market in 
the near future. TETAS is also the holder of all previous BOO, BOT and 
TOOR contracts, including long-term power purchase agreements with 
Treasury guaranties; and will assume other stranded costs10. TEIAS is 
                                                
10 Stranded costs are defined as the costs incurred within the previous market structure that 
cannot be economically recovered within a competitive market structure. In Turkish case, the 
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responsible for transmission and, critically, for the balancing and settlement 
procedure that will balance the power transactions among parties, both 
physically and financially, in the new framework. That is, TEIAS is the 
transmission system operator (TSO) in Turkey.
3.3.1.3. Privatization
The new regime envisages eventual direct privatization in generation and 
distribution. Transmission assets are to remain under government ownership. 
In March 2004, the government issued the Strategy Paper Concerning 
Electricity Market Reform and Privatisation, which outlines the major steps to 
be taken during the period up to 2012 and addresses various issues, 
including the privatisation of distribution assets and power plants. According 
to the strategy paper, privatisation will start in the distribution sector in 2005 
and will be completed in 2006. After the privatization of distribution assets, 
generation privatisation will start in mid-2006. Generation assets will be 
brought together into several groups composed of different types of assets 
for privatisation to enhance competition. Seventeen hydropower plants 
(which total 7,055 MW of capacity11), the transmission system and market 
operator, TEIAS, will remain in state ownership (IEA, 2005, p 144).
                                                                                                                                         
long-term power purchase obligations from private generators with high prices constitute the 
main stranded cost element in the new system. Other stranded costs include high operating 
costs of old and inefficient generators, removal of production subsidies, the debts and 
employment liabilities of public electricity utilities and so on.
11 This figure equals to 19.5 % of total installed capacity in Turkey.
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3.3.1.4. Independent Regulator
As mentioned before, the new regime established the Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority (EMRA), governed by its own 9-member board. The 
main functions of EMRA include:
 setting up and maintaining new licensing framework,
 preparing secondary legislation,
 enforcing rTPA,
 applying a new transmission and distribution code,
 determining eligible customers over time,
 regulating tariffs for transmission and distribution activities as well 
as provision of retail services to non-eligible customers, 
 regulating the wholesale tariff of TETAS,
 performing tenders for gas distribution networks,
 monitoring the performance of all actors in the market,
 protecting customer rights,
 applying sanctions to parties that violate the rules.
EMRA has administrative and financial autonomy; it receives no financing 
from the state budget. It collects its revenues principally from electricity and 
gas licensing fees and from a surcharge on electricity TPA tariff (maximum 
1%). Its total number of staff in August 2005 was 301 (EMRA, 2005a).
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3.3.2. Reforms in Turkish Natural Gas Market
Turkey’s indigenous gas production corresponds to 2.6% of the total gas 
demand making the country almost fully dependent on gas imports (IEA, 
2004a). The government owned Turkish Pipeline Corporation12 (BOTAS) is 
monopoly in almost all segments of the industry. Although its monopoly rights 
on importation, distribution, storage and the sale of natural gas have been 
abolished by the new law, the BOTAS is still Turkey’s sole natural gas 
importer and has a de facto monopoly of gas supply in the country. It has 
eight long-term natural gas sales and purchase contracts with six different 
supply sources. In 2003, the shares of these sources were the Russian 
Federation 59.8%, Algeria 18.2%, Iran 16.6% and Nigeria 5.3% (IEA, 2005).
The objectives of the reform in Turkish gas industry closely accord with those 
in electricity and regulatory arrangements are also substantially parallel13. 
Consumers whose annual consumption is above the threshold set by EMRA, 
or eligible consumers, have the right to choose their own gas suppliers. At 
present, the gas market opening rate is 80% but eligible consumers cannot 
currently choose their suppliers because of the de facto monopolistic position 
of the BOTAS in import and trade.
As of February 2005, EMRA granted 65 licences for different natural gas 
market activities, namely storage, importation (all for the BOTAS), 
                                                
12 BOTAS was founded in 1974 and initially focused on the transport of Iraqi crude oil, 
diversifying into the gas sector after 1987. It was transformed into a state economic 
enterprise in 1995. Currently, it owns pipeline infrastructure for oil and gas transmission, 
LNG terminals, and gas distribution.
13 The new law meets the requirements of the 2003 EU Gas Directive.
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exportation, wholesale, distribution, transmission (only for the BOTAS) and 
CNG operations (IEA, 2005).
A key element of the reform is a requirement for a phased divestment of 
import contracts by the current monopoly importer, the BOTAS. The NGML 
requires the BOTAS to transfer part of its import contracts every year through 
a tendering process (the gas release programme). The first attempt to 
transfer 10% of the BOTAS’s contracts was recently launched; however, the 
process has been delayed due to the complexity of the issue and the 
reluctance of the BOTAS to release its contracts14.
Under the new law, EMRA is also responsible for organizing tenders for 
natural gas distribution licences in the cities. The tender process was carried 
out in 17 cities in 2003 and in almost 20 cities in 2004 (IEA, 2005). 
Finally, despite the fact that gas demand has been growing rapidly for the 
last two decades; now, there is some risk of oversupply due to the 
overestimated demand forecasts. It is estimated that the existing contracts 
outstrip demand over the next 2 to 3 years by 9 to 13%, reaching 20% later in 
the decade15 (IEA, 2005). 
                                                
14 An amendment to NGML, which is obviously supported by BOTAS and would have 
significantly reduced the scope of the gas release programme if implemented, was proposed 
earlier in 2004 but was withdrawn because of heavy opposition from EMRA and other parties 
(IEA, 2005).
15 This is an enormous risk because contracts concluded by the BOTAS are long-term take-
or-pay contracts, meaning that, unless necessary steps are taken, Turkey may find herself in 
a position in which she needs to pay for the gas that she will never use.
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3.3.3. Reforms in Petroleum and LPG Markets
In 2002, Turkey’s oil production was 2,420 thousand tons, which corresponds 
to 8% of the total oil demand (IEA, 2004b). In the coming years, oil 
production is expected to decrease due to the natural depletion of the fields 
(Hepbasli, 2005, p 327).
As for LPG (or liquefied petroleum gas); since the beginning of the 1960s, it 
has been used as an alternative to gas and kerosene in Turkey, while the 
first LPG use in cogeneration plants took place in 1996. In Turkey, LPG is 
marketed in three different segments, namely LPG cylinder, bulk storage 
(storage container), and autogas. Among these, autogas (or automotive 
LPG) is the branch that has grown the most of the three segments in recent 
years. In 2000, the consumption of petroleum products was 30 million tons, 
of which nearly 87% was accounted for by liquid fuel, while LPG constituted 
the rest (Hepbasli, 2005, p 326).
The Petroleum Market Law (PML) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas Market Law 
(LPGML) have liberalized market activities in petroleum and LPG markets 
respectively. Especially, the PML lifted price ceilings16 and removed import 
quotas on petroleum products at the beginning of 2005. EMRA is also 
assigned the responsibility to regulate these markets as well. 
                                                
16 In Turkey, the Automatic Pricing Mechanism (APM) was operational from July 1998 until 
the end of 2004 to establish ceiling prices for gasoline, diesel, kerosene, heavy fuel oil, 
heating oil and LPG. The APM linked ex-refinery prices to CIF Mediterranean product prices. 
Since the abolition of the APM in the beginning of 2005, prices can be set freely provided 
that they reflect the developments in the world oil markets.
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Actually, unlike electricity and gas markets, the petroleum market has been 
operating in a relatively liberalized manner for quite some time before the 
recent reforms. In fact, recent reforms in petroleum market have aimed at 
solving one of the most important problems of Turkish economy in general: 
large-scale fuel smuggling. The recent introduction of a national chemical oil 
marker also targets the same aim. The PML requires EMRA to take 
measures to prevent fuel smuggling and those to introduce and implement 
national chemical marker system in relevant oil products.
4. Critical Analysis
On paper, recent reforms clearly aim for liberalization of Turkish electricity 
and natural gas markets and the ultimate target is deregulation in the long 
run. However, deregulation, which requires development of effective 
competition in a fully functioning market, is a very distant objective in Turkish 
case as Turkey does not have a fully functioning (or even just functioning) 
electricity and natural gas markets, let alone effective competition in these 
markets. Hence, Turkey needs to follow the necessary steps to create the 
conditions for deregulation starting from restructuring and privatization, 
followed by enhancement of competition where possible and (effective) 
regulation where unavoidable; and finally introducing deregulation in the long 
term when the market is ready to do so. Since Turkey is still at the very 
beginning of this process (despite the fact that she started the process 5 
years ago), the paper concentrates only on the first few steps; namely, 
restructuring and privatization; competition; and regulation.
18
4.1. Restructuring and Privatization
Underlying structure of the particular industry being regulated is one of the 
most important determinants in the success of regulation in any market. In 
Turkish case, there is no need for restructuring in petroleum and LPG 
markets as they already have appropriate structure. In electricity market, 
restructuring is either completed or planned to be completed in the near 
future. However, there exists a grave mistake in the restructuring process: 
the preservation of TEIAS as a single entity, which makes the effective 
regulation in transmission system impossible by rendering the only possible 
effective price regulation method17, namely yardstick competition, in this 
segment of the market impossible to implement. As for natural gas industry, 
there is a vital need for restructuring in that industry in which the BOTAS 
currently dominates the entire market.
All powerful economic rationales for privatization cited in the literature are
certainly valid in Turkish case. However; despite that, there are formidable 
political and institutional barriers to privatization in Turkey. Unless carefully 
managed; they can delay, or totally block, the process of privatization.
The first obstacle to privatization in Turkish case is the bureaucratic 
opposition from government owned utilities or labour unions, for instance, to 
maintain their privileged position in current public utilities, excessive work 
                                                
17 It is the only effective way as in all other methods (such as rate of return regulation, RPI-X and so 
on) the regulator needs information about the regulated firm (e.g. cost structure of the firm). As long 
as the regulated firm is a monopoly, it is almost impossible for the regulator to persuade the firm to 
reveal this necessary information. However; in yardstick competition, the regulator employs the 
performance of similar firms in an industry to create some benchmarks, which are in turn used to 
regulate the sector. As long as there is enough number of firms in the industry, this method may 
19
forces or wages above market rates. Although such an opposition is 
generally the case almost in all similar countries, it is especially strong in 
Turkey where bureaucrats are a politically powerful force in their own right.
The second source of opposition to privatization in Turkey originates from the 
concerns based on economic nationalism and the desire to control the 
destiny of the energy industries so central to the economic infrastructure. 
However, there are some simple ways that combine privatization with 
maintaining government control of the key elements of the power system. 
However, in practice, these kind of arguments are employed by the 
bureaucrats at the top of public companies; and they are likely to resist 
privatization on the pretext of the probability that companies with so-called 
“strategic importance” will be taken over by a foreign or multi-national firm, an 
argument that can easily be falsified by, for example, keeping a “golden 
share”.
The last problem with privatization relates the fact that subsidization, 
especially of consumer prices, is common in Turkey. It poses a major barrier 
to efficient privatization; and the elimination of the subsidies may be very 
difficult politically.
Regarding the progress made so far in terms of privatization, in electricity 
industry, the government plan of privatizing distribution company (TEDAS) 
and generation company (EUAS) into several parts is a reasonable approach 
as it may bring immediate competition to the market and/or enable the 
                                                                                                                                         
provide an effective way of regulation. Otherwise, it is not possible to regulate a monopolistic 
industry effectively.
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regulator to compare the performance of newly created private companies. 
However, it seems that government intends to keep both transmission 
company18 (TEIAS) and large parts of the hydro generation facilities. It is 
again a serious mistake with a huge potential to undermine the positive 
expectations about the future structure of the energy market, and thereby 
may undermine the whole reform process. In natural gas market, the BOTAS 
is still there but should be privatized as soon as possible in a way that does 
not let new players have market power.
4.2. Competition
A kind of competition is possible in every segment of Turkish energy industry, 
including transmission and distribution of electricity and gas markets. Also, 
when we take into account the fact that even limited competition provides a 
regulator with some benchmarks against which to measure the performance 
of a dominant firm, gives consumers some alternatives, and forces the 
dominant firm to reduce costs, improve services, innovate and so on; EMRA
should take all necessary steps to enable effective competition in the markets 
it regulates. The markets currently regulated by EMRA may be divided into 
four groups based on the possible type of competition:   
1. The markets in which actual competition exists
Almost all market activities in Turkish petroleum and LPG markets fall into 
this group. Since competition already exists in these markets and the rule 
                                                
18 The Electricity Market Law (EML) does not presume a public transmission system and it 
definitely allows for private transmission.
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is, as suggested by Professor David M. Newbery (Newbery, 2000, p 134), 
“competition where possible, regulation only where unavoidable”; EMRA’s 
role in these markets should be limited to further enhancement of 
competition and taking measures against possible threats to present 
competitive structure. Apart from this, regulation should be kept at 
minimum. In short, in these markets, the policy should be laissez-faire.
2. The markets which are currently not competitive but in which there is a 
potential for actual competition in the near future19
All activities in electricity and natural gas markets with the exceptions of 
transmission and distribution may be placed into this group. Provided that 
EUAS and the BOTAS are privatized appropriately, there exists a huge 
potential for competition in these markets. Especially, electricity 
generation/supply and natural gas importation/supply seem to be highly 
competitive in the near future if necessary steps are taken. Nevertheless; 
until competition develops up to appropriate levels, EMRA should regulate 
these markets. However, while doing so, EMRA should always remember 
that a system of regulation should be evaluated in terms of incentives it 
provides the regulated firm to achieve economic efficiency. Therefore, 
EMRA should apply incentive based regulation (for instance, RPI-X or 
price cap regulation) wherever possible and try to avoid cost-plus 
regulation and its various different forms.
                                                
19 When actual effective competition becomes operational in the future for the markets within 
this group; EMRA should again limit its role to further enhancement of competition and taking 
measures against possible threats to then existing competitive structure.
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3. The markets in which one-to-one competition is not possible but there is a 
potential for competition for the market (franchising) and competition via 
regulation (yardstick competition)
Electricity and natural gas transmission and distribution activities belong 
to this group. However; to activate “competition” in these sectors, the 
BOTAS’s transmission arm should be separated from its other activities. 
Then, this new natural gas transmission company together with its 
counterpart in electricity industry (TEIAS) should be divided into enough 
number of parts in a way that makes effective comparison of performance 
among these newly created companies possible. Finally, all distribution 
and transmission assets should be privatized as soon as possible.
4.3. Regulation
Littlechild (1983) states “[c]ompetition is indisputably the most effective 
means – perhaps ultimately the only effective means – of protecting 
consumers against monopoly power. Regulation is essentially a means of 
preventing the worst cases of monopoly; it is not a substitute for competition.
It is a means of ‘holding the fort’ until competition arrives.” This statement 
well defines the role of regulation in a regulatory system; and implies that 
although the private industry with regulation is far from perfect, it is the best 
answer currently available to monopoly problem. 
Actually, regulation is unavoidably inefficient. The inherent sources of 
inefficiency in regulation are various. For instance, regulated prices may 
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deviate from costs unless economic and non-economic objectives are clearly 
separated. Also, regulation is itself an expensive activity and easily spreads 
from economics into politics, if not properly managed. There are also other 
more fundamental problems inherent in any regulatory situation; namely, 
information asymmetries, commitment issues, the possibility of regulatory 
capture and/or failure. Despite the fact that there are no easy escapes from 
all these problems, in industries with natural monopoly characteristics, the 
extension of competition requires regulation in order to be effective. So, the 
most important problem to address in any reform process is to choose the 
right structure for the industry that will limit the need for naturally inefficient 
regulation. The main idea may be put forward as follows: the most important 
feature of regulation should be that there should be as little of it as possible, 
which involves the identifying the precise sources of market failure in 
industries and targeting regulation specifically on these areas.
Based on these theoretical underpinnings, the current Turkish regulatory 
framework may be evaluated as follows. First of all, EMRA should keep it 
mind that regulation is unavoidably inefficient and therefore it should be 
confined to the core natural monopoly of the network minimizing the extent of 
regulatory inefficiency. EMRA also needs to realize that regulation in essence 
is a kind of incentive mechanism design, which needs to reflect the 
consensus among all related parties such as consumers, firms, politicians, 
academicians and so on. Therefore, EMRA should take all necessary steps 
to create a platform in which everyone related with energy industry may 
express their ideas with a view to reaching such a consensus.
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The effectiveness of regulation depends critically upon the information 
available to the regulator since a regulator can condition its policy only on 
what it knows. However, in practice, the state of unbalanced or “asymmetric” 
information between regulator and firm(s) benefits the regulated at the 
expense of not only the regulator but also actual and potential competitors 
and customers. Therefore, this so-called “asymmetric information problem” is 
at the heart of the economics of regulation20.
The regulatory question is, then, how to motivate the managers of the 
regulated firm to exploit their superior information to advantage despite the 
problem of imperfect information and monitoring. From a practical point of 
view, to alleviate this problem, EMRA needs to put into practice an 
information program, by which the regulated firms provide relevant 
information regularly on the basis of agreed conventions.
Another issue relates what is called regulatory commitment. EMRA must 
ensure that it is committed to the ultimate aim of economic efficiency by 
taking all necessary measures. To do so, first of all, all decisions and 
procedures applied by EMRA should be transparent, which entails that, while 
making a decision, EMRA is required to include the reason(s) for that specific 
decision in detail into the final form of decision that is revealed to the public. 
EMRA should also realize that without transparency in the regulatory process 
it is impossible to ensure regulatory commitment and, therefore, to realize 
economic efficiency. Moreover a body of precedent should be created to 
ensure consistence in regulatory practice. If EMRA rejects transparent 
                                                
20 Actually, the problem of asymmetric information is one of the major sources of inefficiency 
inherent in regulation.
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procedures, it may lose the public credibility, on which its success and 
acceptance so crucially depend. The second measure to guarantee 
regulatory commitment should be in the form of creation of effective appeal 
procedures for the firms, consumers or any other related parties against the 
decisions of EMRA. Under current framework, lawsuits against EMRA’s 
decisions may be filed in the Council of State (in Turkish, “Danistay”), a high 
court in Turkish legal system. However, the Council of State is not well suited 
to review the decisions of EMRA due to technical nature of the matters and 
the need for speedy resolution of outstanding issues. Therefore, as also 
underlined by OECD (OECD, 2002, p 37), in Turkey, there is a need for 
establishment of a specialist regulatory appeal body with suitable expertise in 
regulatory issues. The appeals against the decisions of EMRA should be in 
the first instance to this appeal body that acts with similar discretion and 
flexibility to that of EMRA, not to the Council of State. Furthermore, the 
relation between EMRA and the firms should be based on what is called 
“regulatory contract” to further guarantee regulatory commitment. Current 
practice of provision of licences whose terms are unilaterally determined (and 
also may be altered) by EMRA undermines the regulatory commitment, let 
alone reinforcing it. If a firm considers that licence terms so crucial to its 
future profit level may easily be changed by EMRA at any time, it is almost 
impossible to provide it with incentives to act properly. Finally, to prevent any 
confusion and opportunistic behavior by firms, the appropriate division of 
labor between, on the one hand, general competition authority in Turkey (that 
is, Turkish Competition Authority) and, on the other hand, the specialist 
regulator in Turkish energy market (that is, EMRA) should be clearly 
determined by a protocol to be signed between these two institutions.
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The other major issue in Turkish regulatory framework is the question of how 
to prevent regulatory capture and regulatory failure. To prevent regulatory 
capture by the industry it regulates, EMRA should not only encourage but 
also take concrete measures (if necessary) to set up and institutionalize 
consumer concern to enable active consumer participation in the regulatory 
process. But while doing so, it should pay due attention not to push 
regulation into social, and away from economic, matters; and ensure that 
consumer representatives’ attention is confined to economic matters and 
does not spread over political or non-economic ones.  Regulatory capture by 
government is also a threat to regulatory process especially in Turkey where 
government traditionally has strong powers. To prevent this, ministerial and 
other political influences must be constrained as far as possible to roles that 
do not allow them to influence regulatory decisions. That is, EMRA should be 
independent while making decisions concerning the markets it regulates. 
However, this does not mean unaccountability. EMRA, like any other public 
body in Turkey, must be held accountable for its actions and be subject to 
adequate controls. In short, EMRA should take appropriate steps not to be 
captured either by energy industry or its employees or by politicians or by 
other particular interests, or by self-interest at all costs.
As for regulatory failure, EMRA should make a clear distinction between its 
responsibilities concerning economic and non-economic regulation; and 
should delegate the latter to appropriate bodies as soon as possible. 
Otherwise, its discretion is sooner or later jeopardized by unwise extensions 
of non-economic regulation. Also, EMRA should always keep in mind that a 
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regulatory system which has objectives that either in principle or in practice 
differ from that of economic efficiency spells regulatory failure from an 
economic perspective.
The final critical issue in Turkish regulatory framework is about the quality of 
the persons in the position of regulators (that is, the members of the Energy 
Market Regulatory Board) and the staff of EMRA. As also indicated in OECD 
report (OECD, 2002, p 24), it is important for the credibility of EMRA that not 
only the members of its Board but also its staff are highly qualified, which 
requires strict merit selection and performance management. EMRA should 
seek to recruit a high level of expertise and pay very close attention to 
establish a merit based personnel system.
5. Policy Suggestions
Based on our analysis up to here, the answer to the question that what still 
needs to be done to improve recent energy market reforms in Turkey may be 
divided into three parts according to their urgency, degree of importance, and 
the responsible body to implement them. 
5.1. Policy Suggestions for EMRA
Policy suggestions under this heading require immediate and effective action 
by EMRA, and therefore need to be implemented as soon possible. 
Otherwise, all reform process may face failure at the very beginning due to 
EMRA’s actions or lack of action. To prevent this outcome, first of all, EMRA
28
should take all necessary steps to create a platform in which everyone 
related with Turkish energy industry may express their ideas with a view to 
reaching a consensus21. Second, EMRA is also expected to ensure 
regulatory commitment, which requires particularly transparency, creation of 
a body of precedent and effective appeal procedures against the decisions of 
EMRA. Moreover, EMRA should change, in the medium term, its licencing 
procedure into one based on the logic of private contracts, which is called 
“regulation by contract”22. Fourth, EMRA is advised to introduce all necessary 
measures to prevent regulatory capture and regulatory failure discussed 
before. Furthermore, it may prepare and publish a plan which specifies its 
short, medium and long term objectives in detail so as to strengthen 
regulatory commitment. Sixth, EMRA should put into practice the information 
program mentioned before to alleviate the problem of asymmetric 
information. Additionally, EMRA has to implement strict merit selection and 
performance management in its human resources policies. Eight, EMRA 
needs to clearly separate economic and non-economic issues and take 
appropriate steps to delegate the latter to suitable bodies. In addition, EMRA 
must carry out economic regulation in line with suggestions made before. 
Tenth, EMRA must continue natural gas distribution tenders in the form of 
“franchising” but also develop the mechanisms to introduce “yardstick 
competition” as soon as the construction of distribution networks are 
completed. Finally, it has to restrict the scope of regulation. In literature, it is 
underlined that only network industries require special economic regulation. 
Since petroleum and LPG industries cannot be placed in that group, there is 
                                                
21 Within such a platform; EMRA needs to persuade government, employees, managers, 
taxpayers, potential investors, customers, the financial markets, annalists, media 
commentators and all other related parties of the advantages of the reform process.
22 For a detailed discussion of "regulation by contract", see Bakovic et al. (2003).
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no need for economic regulation in these markets. So, EMRA should do its 
best to eliminate its responsibilities in petroleum and LPG markets as soon 
as possible. As for electricity and natural gas markets, EMRA should restrict 
the regulation to where it is needed; that is, transmission and distribution 
sectors. There is no need for regulation in generation (importation) and retail 
supply sectors. Even, it is unnecessary to distribute licences in these sectors.
5.2. Policy Suggestions for Turkish Government 
Although the discretion of EMRA is limited in terms of the policy suggestions 
under this heading; EMRA still must take appropriate steps to supervise, 
encourage and facilitate the realization of these suggestions that are crucial 
for the outcome of the reforms.
The privatization of energy industry, including TEIAS, BOTAS and all hydro 
generation facilities, should be completed as soon as possible in an 
appropriate way after restructuring where necessary. As discussed before, 
the opposition to privatization of some bureaucrats will definitely be 
formidable. To counter this, a chairman who is more favorable to privatization 
may be appointed to the enterprises to be privatized. Second, the 
government is advised not to intervene in EMRA’s decisions concerning 
economic regulation of energy markets. If it disagrees with EMRA in any 
issue, the government should have recourse to appropriate appeal 
procedures. The government is also expected to delegate all non-economic 
responsibilities of EMRA to related bodies. In particular, it should prepare and 
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put into force the necessary legislation that removes EMRA’s responsibilities 
in petroleum and LPG markets23.
The government ought to appoint the members of EMRA’s board based on 
strict merit norms. The consequences of political appointments to EMRA may 
turn out to be destructive for the future of the country as a whole. Also, when 
all privatizations are completed, the energy sector and other related interests 
should be represented in the Board as well, which requires that some 
members of the Board should be selected by these interest groups. The 
government may also establish a specialist regulatory appeal body with 
suitable expertise in regulatory issues. 
The BOTAS’s share in imports should also be reduced, which is absolutely 
necessary for the market liberalization to be successful and competition to 
develop. Finally, the government should stop all forms of subsidy that affect 
price structure and provide subsidies only in the form of direct cash refunds if 
necessary.
5.3. Other Policy Suggestions
The policy suggestions under this heading are deemed beneficial for the 
future progress of Turkish reforms from an economic perspective but they 
                                                
23 Up to now, EMRA has distributed almost 10.000 licences to prevent fuel smuggling in 
Turkey. However, since this was an irrational step from the very beginning especially when 
we take into account the fact that an institution with only about 300 people cannot effectively 
monitor the implementation of licence terms of so many licences (let alone their 
enforcement); EMRA has already had to delegate most of its responsibilities in this area to 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs via a protocol signed between EMRA and the Ministry. So, 
what is suggested here is just the reflection of actual practice into legal system (EMRA; 
2005b,c).
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also need to be further discussed among related parties before actual 
implementation.
All persons or bodies that do not have sufficient expertise in issues related 
with energy markets but whose ideas or decisions have still a vital effect on 
the energy market should consult those with expertise before revealing their 
ideas or making some decisions with an (sometimes, profound) effect on the 
energy markets. The decisions of courts are especially critical in this respect.
EMRA should also prepare and publish a timetable indicating the process of 
reducing eligibility threshold to zero both in electricity and natural gas 
markets. Current “Strategy Paper” is not enough in this perspective.
EMRA and Turkish government should deal with the problem of “stranded 
costs” in a way that does not undermine the trust in the system and within the 
boundaries of the principle of “rule of law”.
EMRA should manage to ensure consistency in the decisions of its multi-
member board. If this cannot be done, the practice of “regulation by an 
individual”, rather than “regulation by a board”, should be considered as an 
alternative. 
EMRA should initiate the process of signing a protocol with Turkish 
Competition Authority to determine appropriate division of labour between 
them.
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6. Conclusion
Despite relatively good legislative framework, the current regulatory policy in 
Turkey towards the energy industry in practice seems to be far from ideal. 
The reforms are mainly in the form of “textbook reforms”, meaning that they 
are simply copied from regulation literature with some modifications but in 
practice the crucial underlying economic logic behind them is not taken into 
account either by EMRA or by the Turkish government. It should not be 
forgotten that every new structure entails new understanding of the issues. 
However; in Turkish case, new reform has been tried to be implemented 
within previous degenerated bureaucratic understanding, which is simply 
impossible. As long as the vital decisions regarding the future of energy 
industry have been taken in the depths of some government departments, 
including those of EMRA; it is definitely impossible to create a fully 
functioning market and the result may turn out to be a disaster for the country 
as a whole. On the other hand, the energy industry is a complex one; and the 
creation of a market for energy, where none previously existed, is no easy 
task. Not surprisingly, there will be problems but most of them will disappear 
with the growth of more effective competition provided that necessary change 
in understanding mentioned above is materialized.
If reforms are practiced by taking into account their underlying economic 
logic, there is no reason not to believe that the domestic and foreign 
investors will be greatly interested in entering a market with excellent growth 
potential, like Turkish energy market. If implemented properly, the reforms 
my transform Turkey from a simple so-called “Eurasia energy corridor” into 
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an “energy base” where electricity is produced and exported to various 
regions surrounding the country, especially Europe. 
Also, one should not blame the bureaucrats in the Turkish energy industry, its 
unions, and others for trying to protect what they see as their interests by 
persuading the government to retain previous structure as much as possible. 
But it will be a catastrophe for the country as a whole if they are successful in 
doing so as the way would be open for continued government manipulation 
of these public corporations. 
As no meaningful competition has developed so far, a significant amount of 
work still lies ahead. It should not be forgotten that the true test of regulatory 
success comes in the form of whether a structure in which generators, 
suppliers, customers and other actors in the market can all freely negotiate, 
each taking their own view of the prices, risks, opportunities and threats that 
a competitive market offers is created or not.
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